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Abstract
Security in optical encryption techniques is a subject of great importance, especially in light of
recent reports of successful attacks. We propose a new procedure to reinforce the ciphertexts
generated in double random phase encrypting experimental setups. This ciphertext is protected
by multiplexing with a ‘salt’ ciphertext coded with the same setup. We present an experimental
implementation of the ‘salting’ technique. Thereafter, we analyze the resistance of the ‘salted’
ciphertext under some of the commonly known attacks reported in the literature, demonstrating
the validity of our proposal.
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1. Introduction
Optical cryptosystems are an interesting field of research, due
to their many degrees of freedom and their potential to pro-
vide fast and reliable data security. The first optical encryp-
tion scheme was proposed by Refreiger and Javidi [1], called
double random phase mask encryption (DRPE) scheme. Since
then, many alternative optical encryption systems have been
proposed, highlighting the flexibility of these setups [2].
Further research deals with the main limitations of the
DRPE systems [3], namely, the challenges regarding their
experimental realization, or the degradation of the decrypted
data compared with the input objects [4], while at the same
time attempting to assess and to improve their security [5].
As part of the ongoing efforts in determining the security
of these systems, researchers have proposed a variety of
attacks against them. These attacks are classified depending
on the amount of information and access to the cryptosystem
that is assumed available to the attacker.
The first of these categories of attacks is the chosen
plaintext attack (CPA), where the attacker has full access to the
cryptosystem, and can introduce specially tailored plaintexts to
be encrypted in order to deduce the encryption key. This was
the first kind of attack demonstrated against the DRPE scheme
[6]; however, several methods have been proposed to thwart
them [7, 8]. In practice, most actual encryption systems, digital
or optical, are known to be vulnerable if the attacker has full
access to the encryption machine.
The next attack is the known plaintext attack (KPA), where
one or more plaintext–ciphertext pairs are in possession of the
attacker [9, 10]. The unauthorized user has no access to the
machine, cannot choose the plaintexts at his disposal, and his
target is to deduce the encryption key from the available
information. Depending on the number of plaintext–ciphertext
pairs available to the intruder, there are several different
implementations of KPA against optical cryptosystems. Like in
CPA, several modifications have been proposed to harden the
DRPE systems against these attacks [11].
Finally, the last kind of attack to be successfully demon-
strated against DRPE systems is the ciphertext only attack
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(COA) [12–16], where the intruder can retrieve the plaintext
directly from the ciphertext, without the need for the encryption
key. This is the most critical attack any cryptosystem must resist
to be considered secure. In optical cryptosystems, COA makes
use of phase retrieval algorithms. As a measure to guarantee
their convergence to a solution, additional information about the
encryption scheme is often necessary, for example the object and
key sizes.
According to the above descriptions, it becomes evident
that the developing of new methods to increase the security of
DRPE systems is of great relevance in the field.
In this work, we propose a new procedure to strengthen the
ciphertext produced by DRPE schemes against attacks. We
achieve this by multiplexing the ciphertext of the data to be
safeguarded with another ciphertext encrypted with the same
system. This technique is analog to the ‘cryptographic salting’
of the ciphertexts found in some computer encryption algo-
rithms, to guarantee that the same plaintext produces different
ciphertexts [17]. In these algorithms, random data is added to
the plaintext prior or after encryption, altering the resulting
ciphertext. This is especially relevant in large databases con-
taining encrypted passwords. In these cases, an entropy attack
aided by a dictionary of common passwords can be used to
guess a portion of the plaintexts, and from there the encryption
key may be cracked by the use of known-plaintext attacks.
In optical encryption, a similar level of protection can be
achieved with our proposal, where each ciphertext is multiplexed
with another ciphertext corresponding to a ‘salt’. Each time the
system encrypts a new data, the salt is changed, to ensure that
two ciphertexts always have different salts, even when encrypted
using the same key.
2. Encryption and cryptographic salting scheme
To show the effectiveness of our proposal, we will use as case
study the joint transform correlator (JTC) cryptosystem [18]
with amplitude encoding, as shown in figure 1.
In the experimental setup, one arm contains the JTC
system and the other provides a reference plane wave that will
be used to register the encryption key. In the JTC system, the
input plane has two windows, separated a distance 2b that are
projected on a SLM placed in the focal plane of a convergent
lens. The SLM is in contact with a random phase mask,
provided by a ground glass diffuser. One of the windows is an
empty square and will be used as key window. Light propa-
gates through the diffuser, acquiring a random phase and then
through the key window. This produces the encryption key.
The image to be encrypted is projected in the other window,
which will be the object window. In the conjugate plane of
the lens, there is a CMOS camera as an intensity recording
medium. To achieve encryption, we block the reference wave,
and then the CMOS camera registers the intensity of the
interference between the Fourier transforms (FTs) of both
windows, called the joint power spectrum (JPS).
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where * means complex conjugate, and ( )K v w, , ( )F v w, are
the FTs of the key window ( )k x y, , and the object window
given by =( ) ( ) ( )f x y o x y r x y, , , , respectively, with ( )o x y,
the object and ( )r x y, the object window phase mask.
The JPS is sometimes considered the ciphertext of the JTC
encryption scheme, since the original data can be retrieved from
it by using the correct encryption key. The JPS as ciphertext,
however, is vulnerable to COA since it contains information
about the input plane beyond the encrypted object, as seen in
equation (1). Peng et al [12] demonstrated that the recovery of
the encrypted data from the JPS can be achieved by solving a
phase retrieval problem with a single measurement. The inverse
Fourier transform (IFT) of the JPS contains information about
the distance 2b and the key and object sizes. This information
allows for the convergence of the phase retrieval problem. To
avoid these vulnerabilities, we can extract from the JPS the data
related to the ciphertext (in our case the fourth term of
Figure 1. Experimental JTC cryptosystem (SLM: spatial light modulator, CS: collimation system, M: mirror, L: lens, BS: beam splitter,
GGD: ground glass diffuser).
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equation (1)), discarding remaining data. This is done by per-
forming the IFT of the JPS, which results in a central order and
two side orders containing the ciphertext and its complex
conjugate. We can filter the unwanted terms while retaining the
ciphertext [19], which is given by
*= Ä( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )e x y o x y r x y k x y, , , , , 2
where ( )o x y, is the plaintext the attacker wants to retrieve,
( )r x y, and ( )k x y, are random phase masks.
Decryption is achieved by performing the IFT of the
ciphertext, multiplying it by the FT of the encryption key
( )k x y, and then performing the FT of the result. To experi-
mentally register the encryption key, we use the scheme of
figure 1 with the reference arm unblocked, and we project
only the key window in the SLM. The lens performs the FT of
the encryption key in the camera plane, which will interfere
with the reference plane wave. The resulting intensity pattern
is an off-axis Fourier hologram of the encryption key which is
registered by the CMOS camera. After eliminating the DC
term and the twin image from this hologram [20], we recover
the encryption key ( )k x y, .
We now introduce our salting proposal, where using the
same system, we encrypt a ‘salt’ ( )s x y, . The salt may be any
object with larger support than the plaintext of the data to be
salted, for example, a random amplitude mask. The ciphertext
of this salt is then multiplexed with the ciphertext of the data
we are interested in protecting. The salted ciphertext is then
given by
*
*
= Ä
+ Ä
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After decryption with the correct key ( )k x y, , the
recovered data is given by
= +( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( )d x y o x y r x y s x y r x y, , , , , , 4s
which is an overlap of the salt and the object. If an authorized
user knows the salt plaintext and the two-phase masks, he/she
can subtract it from equation (4) to recover the object ( )o x y, .
It is worth noting that depending on the salt and the
encrypted object, the decrypted object may remain recog-
nizable even if the salt is not subtracted from the result (see
figure 2(d)). Therefore, salt is not an additional encryption
key, but rather a way to hinder attacks. The salt ciphertext
should not be available to anyone, to prevent an attacker from
simply subtracting it from the salted ciphertext to undo the
salting.
3. Cryptographic salting results
We test the reconstruction of the salted ciphertext by using data
encrypted with the experimental implementation of the scheme
of figure 1. The object and key windows had a size of 4.096
mm by 4.096mm. The lens focal length was 200mm and a
DPSS laser with a wavelength of 532 nm and 300mW of power
was used. The registering medium was a EO-10012C CMOS
camera with a resolution of 3840×2748 and a pixel size
of 1.67 mm.
Figure 2(a) is the input object, with figure 2(b) the result
after encryption–decryption without salting the ciphertext.
We choose as salt a random amplitude mask, shown in
figure 2(c). In figure 2(d), we see the result of decrypting the
salted ciphertext with the correct key. As previously dis-
cussed, the decrypted plaintext is recognizable with a slight
degradation in quality. In figure 2(e), we show the decrypted
result from the salted ciphertext after subtracting the salt
plaintext. As expected, the quality becomes very similar to the
unsalted result shown in figure 2(b).
4. Resistance to data loss and noise of the ciphertext
One of the advantages of DRPE encryption schemes is that its
ciphertexts are highly resistant to data loss and noise. We now
show that salting does not affect this resistance. To do this,
we used the ciphertext corresponding to the results of
section 3.
We tested the resistance to data loss, by removing ran-
domly distributed pixels in both the salted and unsalted
ciphertext. The resulting ciphertexts were decrypted with the
correct key. Then we obtained the correlation coefficient cc
between the decrypted object from the unsalted ciphertext
without data loss R compared with the one obtained from the
salted and unsalted ciphertexts after data loss I. The correla-
tion coefficient is given by
å å
=
- -
å å - å å -( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )cc
R R I I
R R I I
, 5
m n mn mn
m n nm m n nm
2 2
where n m, are pixel coordinates, and R I, are the mean
values of R and I.
As we can see in figure 3, salting introduces a small
reduction of the correlation coefficient. However, the beha-
vior after data loss is very similar to the one of the unsalted
ciphertext.
We also tested the effect of additive noise on the salted and
unsalted ciphertexts. We added random noise with increasing
amplitude and we calculated the correlation coefficient between
the decrypted object from the unsalted ciphertext without
additive noise compared with the decrypted data obtained from
the salted and unsalted ciphertext with additive noise.
In figure 4, we show that the resistance to additive noise
remains roughly the same for salted and unsalted ciphertexts.
The results of figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that salting can be
implemented without altering the robustness of DRPE
ciphertexts.
5. Resistance to attacks
We will now discuss the effects salting has on some of the
most widely reported attacks against the DRPE systems. The
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most basic attack against the JTC cryptosystem is the Dirac
delta attack or impulse attack. This is a CPA where the
attacker uses the cryptosystem to encrypt a Dirac delta. The
resulting ciphertext is then
*d= Ä( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )e x y x y r x y k x y, , , , 6cpa
which is the conjugate of the encryption key with a constant
phase. If we continue to consider an ideal simulated setup,
when our ciphertext is now salted, we obtain
*
*
d= Ä
+ Ä
( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )
[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
e x y x y r x y k x y
s x y r x y k x y
, , , ,
, , , . 7
scpa
Figure 2. Decrypted data from salted ciphertext: (a) input plaintext, (b) decrypted object without salt, (c) salt plaintext, (d) decryption result
from salted ciphertext and (e) decryption result from salted ciphertext after subtraction of the salt plaintext.
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If we can guarantee that the salted function overlaps the
key (the support of ( )s x y, is larger than the support of
( )k x y, ), it is not possible to separate the salted ciphertext
from the key information.
This attack is difficult to accomplish in an experimental
setup, where an attacker would only be able to encrypt an
aperture with a finite size, not an ideal Dirac delta. Further-
more, the key is contained in the JPS, which is an interference
pattern. This means that the amount of light coming from the
finite aperture must be similar than the amount of light
coming from the key window to ensure adequate fringe
visibility.
Due to these difficulties, we tested the resistance of the
salted ciphertext to this attack by using a virtual optical sys-
tem. The object and key windows had a size of 4.096 by
4.096 mm. The simulated lens focal length was 200 mm and
coherent illumination with a wavelength of 532 nm was
considered.
In figure 5, we can see the result of attempting to use the
Dirac delta attack on a JTC system without salting
(figure 5(a)) and with salting (figure 5(b)). As expected from
equation (7), the presence of the salt ciphertext obfuscates the
key information, enhancing the security of the system.
Another possible attack is the KPA. The working
assumption is that the attacker has access to one or more
plaintexts and their respective ciphertexts.
If we take the FT of the unsalted ciphertext in equation (2)
we obtain
*= Ä( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )E v w O v w R v w K v w, , , , , 8
where ( )O v w, and ( )R v w, are the FTs of the object ( )o x y,
and phase mask ( )r x y, , respectively. Taking the intensity of
equation (2), and assuming ( )K v w, as a phase only function,
we obtain
=∣ ( )∣ ∣ { ( ) ( )}∣ ( )E v w FT o x y r x y, , , . 92 2
From equation (8), we can conclude that if the attacker
knows ( )o x y, , and since the plaintext is taken to be an
amplitude only distribution, he/she can apply the Gerchberg–
Saxton algorithm to recover the missing phase, which will
correspond to ( )r x y, . Once the intruder is in possession of this
phase, the encryption key can be estimated by solving
=( ) ( )
{ ( ) ( )}
( )K v w E v w
FT o x y r x y
,
,
, ,
. 10
If we attempt this attack on the salted ciphertext of
equation (3), we obtain, after the IFT
*
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Taking the intensity of equation (11)
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The first term of equation (12) is the intensity of the FT of
the object window, which is the relevant data necessary to
successfully retrieve the key using this KPA. This information,
however, suffers cross talk from the remaining terms of
equation (12), which appears due to the addition of the salt
ciphertext. This cross talk ensures that a phase retrieval algo-
rithm fails unless the attacker has access to additional data, like
the salt ciphertext, which should not be available to any user.
The salt should be changed in each run of the encrypting
system to maintain security. Additional protection is achieved
if the salt is encrypted with different masks.
The last attacks reported are the COA. These work by
taking the amplitude retrieved in equation (9) and performing
a phase retrieval algorithm without knowledge of the plain-
text, like the hybrid input–output algorithm. To achieve
convergence of the solution, the attacker makes use of
assumptions about the encrypted object, for example, that
Figure 3. Correlation coefficient of the decrypted data from salted
and unsalted ciphertext after data loss.
Figure 4. Correlation coefficient of the decrypted data from salted
and unsalted ciphertext after adding random noise.
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( )o x y, is an amplitude only object, that its support is
well known or the number of non-zero pixels in the plain-
text [13].
From equation (12), we see that the amplitude of the FT
of the object cannot be retrieved from the salted ciphertext,
making unfeasible some of the known COA with phase
retrieval.
The autocorrelation of the ciphertext speckle pattern
contains information about the energy spectral distribution
(ESD). Some approaches to COA take advantage of this fact
to retrieve the plaintext. This approach has been used in
imaging through turbid media [21] and in experimental
implementations of COA attacks [15, 16].
In figure 6, we show the results of a COA attack on the
ciphertext of the letter A before and after salting with a ran-
dom amplitude mask. First, we calculate the autocorrelation
of the unsalted (figure 6(c)) and salted ciphertext (figure 6(d)).
The autocorrelation of the object window is show in
figure 6(b) for comparison. We note that the ESD of the
ciphertext is almost equal to the ESD of the object window,
while the ESD obtained with the salted ciphertext is quite
different. We attempted COA by using a hybrid input–output
algorithm with the autocorrelations of figures 6(c) and (d). We
assumed that the number of non-zero pixels and the support
of the plaintext is known to the attacker. With this informa-
tion, the COA is successful against the unsalted ciphertext, as
shown in figure 6(e). However, the attack fails against the
salted ciphertext (figure 6(f)).
6. Conclusions
Cryptographic salting can be applied to any DRPE scheme,
even though our demonstration deals with the JTC crypto-
system. In a salting cryptosystem, the end user would know
the encryption key, the salted ciphertext and potentially the
salt plain text. In an ideal setup, the salt ciphertext and the
unsalted ciphertext are never known to any party, neither
the sender nor the receiver, and the salt is changed each time
the system encrypts a new data to maintain security.
Figure 5. (a) Decrypted data using a key retrieved by a Dirac delta attack, (b) the same data decrypted using the result of a Dirac delta attack
on a cryptosystem with salting.
Figure 6.Demonstration of COA on a salted and unsalted ciphertext.
(a) Input plaintext, (b) autocorrelation of the object window, (c)
autocorrelation of the unsalted ciphertext, (d) autocorrelation of the
salted ciphertext, (e) result of COA against the unsalted ciphertext
and (f) result of COA against the salted ciphertext.
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Our proposal can be modified by multiplexing the salt
and object ciphertext with other methods rather than by direct
summation. By demonstrating a method to increase the
security of the DRPE systems, this proposal opens a new
avenue of research for the cryptanalysis of optical security
systems, and invites the possibility of developing methods to
attack multiplexed packages which may be used in actual
real-world implementations of optical encryption.
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